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In last summer’s debate over immigration
reform, Congress treated a national electronic
employment eligibility verification (EEV) system
as a matter of near consensus. Intended to
strengthen internal enforcement of the immigra-
tion laws, electronic EEV is an Internet-based
employee vetting system that the federal govern-
ment would require every employer to use. 
Broad immigration reform failed before Con-
gress thoroughly considered national EEV, but the
lines of debate have been drawn. Advocates in
Congress will try to attach a nationwide worker reg-
istration system to any immigration bill Congress
considers, and the Bush administration recently
announced steps to promote such a system.
A mandatory national EEV system would have
substantial costs yet still fail to prevent illegal
immigration. It would deny a sizable percentage
of law-abiding American citizens the ability to
work legally. Deemed ineligible by a database,
millions each year would go pleading to the
Department of Homeland Security and the
Social Security Administration for the right to
work. By increasing the value of committing
identity fraud, EEV would cause that crime’s rates
to rise.
Creating an accurate EEV system would re-
quire a national identification (ID) system, cost-
ing about $20 billion to create and hundreds of
millions more per year to operate. Even if it were
free, the country should reject a national ID sys-
tem. It would cause law-abiding American citi-
zens to lose more of their privacy as government
records about them grew and were converted to
untold new purposes. “Mission creep” all but
guarantees that the federal government would
use an EEV system to extend federal regulatory
control over Americans’ lives even further. 
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Introduction
More than a decade ago, a Cato Institute
study opened with an urgent alert:
Republicans in the House and Senate
are moving quickly forward with Or-
wellian legislation that would create a
national computerized registration sys-
tem for all American workers. The new
federal computer worker registry, which
is intended to reduce illegal immigra-
tion, is the crucial first step toward the
implementation of a national identifica-
tion card system for all 120 million
American workers.1
In their paper, “A National ID System: Big
Brother’s Solution to Illegal Immigration,”
John J. Miller from the Center for Equal
Opportunity and Stephen Moore of the Cato
Institute called this system “an ill-conceived
idea that would grant the government vast
new police-state powers, require citizens to
surrender basic freedoms and privacy rights,
and fail to halt illegal immigration.” The lead-
ers of virtually every libertarian, conservative,
and civil liberties organization in America,
they reported, had denounced the computer
registry as “misguided and dangerous.”2
Miller and Moore’s study evidently educat-
ed policymakers and helped stave off such a
system. Nevertheless, a pilot program begun
then now threatens to resurrect the national
computerized registration system they warned
of, with all the big-government ills that sur-
round it. A dozen years later, it is time to
sound the alarm again.
In last summer’s congressional debate on
immigration reform, a worker registration and
national identification (national ID) system
was treated almost as a matter of consensus
agreement. It remains a viable—even promi-
nent—policy option in the immigration area,
and legislation requiring national worker reg-
istration and a national ID system could
advance with any immigration-related legisla-
tion moving through Congress. The Bush
administration announced a number of steps
in mid-August 2007 to promote registration
and tracking of American workers.
About 10 years before Miller and Moore
sounded the alarm in their Cato study, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19863
introduced the concept of “internal enforce-
ment” into U.S. immigration law. IRCA condi-
tioned Americans’ ability to work on proving
their legal presence and status in the country.
This requirement was supposed to suppress
illegal immigration by reducing the magnet of
relatively high-paying work that brought such
immigrants into the country.
But internal enforcement did not work.
With employment in the United States still
very attractive and legal opportunities for
immigration restricted, people continued to
come to the United States illegally.
Policymakers conveniently chalked up the
failure of internal enforcement to weakness in
implementation rather than to theory or
design. They quickly set to strengthening inter-
nal enforcement rather than scrapping it. The
creation of an electronic employment eligibili-
ty system called “Basic Pilot” in 1996 was one
such measure. As Miller and Moore had point-
ed out, making it work would require a nation-
al ID card and massive databases of informa-
tion about all American workers. Nevertheless,
Basic Pilot went ahead, and it may soon move
further forward.
Along with its Orwellian features, today we
know that administering a system of electron-
ic EEV would conjure Franz Kafka as well. A
sizable percentage of workers—foreign- and
native-born alike—would be denied the ability
to work legally by a faceless federal database
system. Deemed ineligible by the database, mil-
lions of American workers each year would
have to present themselves at the Department
of Homeland Security and the Social Security
Administration, clutching their identity papers
and pleading for the right to work. 
Such a system would make working in the
United States more difficult, of course, but it
would not eliminate the United States’ attrac-
tion to immigrants. Some potential illegal
immigrants would change their plans, but
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others would respond quite differently. Some
workers and employers would collude to avoid
this immigration enforcement system. Work
“under the table” would increase and, along
with it, other forms of illegality. 
The value of committing identity fraud
would rise, and more illegal immigrants would
commit this crime or deepen the minor frauds
they are now involved in. Criminals and crimi-
nal rings would use the Social Security number
(SSN) data from stolen laptops and hacked
databases much more often in identity fraud
as a robust black market for Americans’ per-
sonal information emerged.
The use of these data to fabricate mock
identities would compound the problem for
victims in a diabolical way. Seeking to prove
their right to simple employment, American
workers would have to appeal to bureaucrats
who assume they are identity thieves.
Miller and Moore were correct: creating an
accurate federal EEV system would require a
national ID system. Such a system would have
extraordinary costs. About $20 billion would
be the tally for implementing a national ID
system, some of that cost hidden in taxes,
some of it paid directly by each national-ID-
carrying worker. Operating the verification
program would cost at least $300 million to
$400 million per year.
The cost in lost privacy to all Americans
would be high. Both employers and the gov-
ernment would have to collect and store per-
sonal information about American workers
that is not necessary for employment—only
for administration of employment laws and
regulations. Kept in digital form for long
periods, this personal information could be
readily converted to untold new purposes.
Even if this system were workable and cost-
effective, we should not want it. “Mission
creep” all but guarantees that the federal gov-
ernment would use a worker registration and
surveillance system to capture greater regula-
tory control over Americans’ lives. Ultimately,
all kinds of transactions that are now person-
al and private, or matters of state or local law,
would become subjects of federal government
authority. 
Partisan control of Congress and the presi-
dency has reversed since Miller and Moore
attacked the Republican plan to register all
American workers in 1995, but national-ID-
based worker surveillance seems alive and well
under a Democratic Congress. More clear than
ever are the sound reasons why electronic
employment eligibility verification (EEV) and
“internal enforcement” should be rejected.
Dysfunctional Immigration
Law Begets EEV
The nation’s immigration policy is at a
crossroads. According to Labor Department
projections, the U.S. economy, which is
already near full employment,4 will continue
to create 400,000 or more low-skilled jobs
annually in the service sector—tasks like food
preparation, cleaning, construction, landscap-
ing, and retail sales. Yet from 1996 to 2004, the
number of adult Americans without a high
school education—the demographic that typi-
cally fills those jobs—fell by 4.6 million.5
These demographic facts create very pow-
erful economic forces. Demand in the United
States for both low- and high-skilled workers
is high, and workers in many nearby countries
badly need the work offered in the United
States. The economic gradient is steep.
Just as water follows the laws of gravity,
workers continually move to the United
States. Unlike water, however, which simple
barriers can stop, people on both sides of the
border dedicate their ingenuity to getting
what they want and need. The self-interest of
employers and workers is a powerful (and
almost always beneficial) force that is hard to
quell or conquer. Thus, migration into the
United States has persisted over the last sev-
eral decades.
Today, however, the political consensus
holds that the country has too many immi-
grants and that something must be done
about it.6 A part of that consensus is that inter-
nal enforcement of immigration law should
be strengthened, including by electronic em-
ployment eligibility verification. EEV requires
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employers to run background checks with the
government on new or existing employees to
see whether they are eligible to work under the
immigration laws.
A full-fledged EEV system has many prac-
tical and technical problems, to say nothing
of the question of whether it is appropriate
for a free country. But the human forces that
a policy would channel or counteract are the
most important influences on how the sup-
porting technical system must be designed.
Those forces determine where the challenges
the system will come from and what the
human and monetary costs will be if it is to
work for its intended purpose. Immigration
law—today deeply at odds with Americans’
interests—is the source of the problem and
the starting point for analysis.
America’s Original Open Borders Close
At the time of the founding and during the
early part of U.S. history, the country’s immi-
gration policy was one of open borders. Nat-
uralization rules fluctuated, and the law
authorized the president to expel dangerous
foreign nationals, but immigrants were wel-
come. 
Indeed, in 1864, because of a labor short-
age caused by the Civil War, Congress passed
legislation to encourage immigration. It
allowed enforcement in U.S. courts of the
agreements immigrants had made in their
home countries to repay their travel costs
from wages earned in America. The law also
established a federal government office in
New York City to help immigrants reach their
interior U.S. destinations.7
In 1875 Congress passed the first law to
exclude people, aimed at convicts and prosti-
tutes. The practice of exclusion was promptly
adapted to racial and ethnic prejudice by 1882’s
Chinese Exclusion Acts, and, in the 1920s, a
national-origin quota system greatly restricted
immigration from countries outside northern
and western Europe. National-origin quotas
persisted until 1965 when the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments initiated a seven-
category system for family reunification and
employment-based categories.
By the 1980s, the United States was seeing
a strong flow of immigrants from Mexico and
Central America. This paralleled earlier flows
from Germany, Ireland, Italy, and elsewhere,
but these immigrants could enter through
uncontrolled parts of a land border without
documentation. In 1986 Congress determined
that illegal immigration rates were too high,
but in passing the Immigration Reform and
Control Act,8 Congress failed to recognize
either the power of the economic forces under-
lying such immigration or its benefits.
While legalizing the illegal aliens in the
country, Congress declined to expand legal
channels for immigration. Instead, it changed
the long-standing natural rule that working in
the United States depended simply on willing-
ness and ability. Americans’ right to earn an
honest living by trading their labor would now
have to wait for proof of compliance with fed-
eral immigration laws. 
“Internal Enforcement” and “Basic
Pilot”
IRCA made unlawful the knowing hire of
workers who are not eligible to work in the
United States under the immigration laws.9
By requiring employers to check employees’
documentation, the law conscripted employ-
ers into immigration law enforcement. All
employers today are required to verify
employees’ work eligibility by collecting com-
pleted I-9 forms and by checking employees’
documentation.10
The logic behind this idea was simple:
making it illegal to hire an illegal immigrant
could reduce the strength of this country’s
economic “magnet.” But the policy of “inter-
nal enforcement” built on this simple logic
failed. Just as a magnet’s attraction passes
through paper, the attraction of the United
States to immigrants surpasses this paper-
work.
The I-9 process and employer sanctions
undoubtedly had some effect on illegal immi-
gration and working, but not very much.
Between 1986 and 1996, illegal immigration
rates appear to have remained steady.11 Docu-
ment fraud undermined the I-9 system, and
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the law prompted some employers to discrim-
inate wrongly against citizens and legal immi-
grants because of their Hispanic surnames,
poor English-language skills, or appearance.
Ten years later, with illegal immigration
continuing apace, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
199612 sought to “improve on” the failing pol-
icy of internal enforcement. It required the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to
commence three pilot programs to test elec-
tronic verification of employees’ work eligibili-
ty. These were the Citizen Attestation Verifi-
cation Pilot Program, the Machine-Readable
Document Pilot Program, and the Basic Pilot
Program. These three programs were intended
to test whether verification procedures could
make the existing Form I-9 process better by (1)
reducing document fraud and false claims of
U.S. citizenship, (2) discouraging discrimina-
tion against employees, (3) avoiding violations
of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) minimiz-
ing the burden on employers to verify employ-
ees’ work eligibility.13
The Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
Program allowed workers to attest to their citi-
zenship status. The status of new hires attest-
ing to being work-authorized noncitizens was
electronically checked against information in
INS databases. Unsurprisingly, ineligible work-
ers simply attested to being citizens. Employers
did not ferret out this kind of fraud. Many did
discriminate against work-authorized nonciti-
zens, however, likely because of the paperwork
and liability risks such workers presented. The
Department of Homeland Security terminated
the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
Program in 2003.
DHS initiated the Machine-Readable Doc-
ument Pilot Program in Iowa because that
state issued driver’s licenses and ID cards car-
rying the information required for the I-9 in
machine-readable form. Nevertheless, the pro-
gram had technical difficulties in reading the
driver’s licenses and IDs, and it was under-
mined by the state’s transition away from
using SSNs on driver’s licenses, which was
done in the interest of protecting Iowans’ pri-
vacy and data security. DHS terminated the
Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program
in 2003 as well.
Basic Pilot—first renamed the “employment
eligibility verification” program, or EEV, and
then renamed again, “E-Verify”—is the remain-
ing effort to verify work eligibility electronically.
As of May 2007, about 9,000 of the 17,000
employers registered for the system were active
users.14 Currently, about 52,000 of the coun-
try’s 5.9 million employers have registered for
it—about .88 percent.15 Congress extended the
Basic Pilot program in January 200216 and
again in December 2003.17 It is currently set to
expire in late 2008.
How Electronic Employment Verification
Works
After collecting I-9 forms, participating
employers enter the information supplied by
workers into a government website. The sys-
tem compares these data with information
held by the Social Security Administration
and with DHS databases. If the name and SSN
pairs match to citizen data at the SSA, a work-
er is approved. The system compares informa-
tion from noncitizens with DHS data to deter-
mine whether the employee is eligible to work. 
E-Verify electronically notifies employers
whether their employees’ work authorization
is confirmed. Submissions that the automat-
ed check cannot confirm are referred to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service staff in
the Department of Homeland Security, who
take further steps to verify eligibility or who
find the worker ineligible.
When E-Verify cannot confirm a worker’s
eligibility, it issues the employer a “tentative
nonconfirmation.” The employer must noti-
fy the affected worker of the finding, and the
worker has the right to contest his or her ten-
tative nonconfirmation within eight working
days by contacting the SSA or DHS. 
When a worker does not contest his or her
tentative nonconfirmation within the allotted
time, the E-Verify program issues a final non-
confirmation for the worker. The employer is re-
quired to either immediately terminate the
worker or notify DHS that it continues to em-
ploy the worker—confessing to a law violation.
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The Administration Pushes EEV
The administration recently began to ex-
pand the federal government’s use of E-Verify
and instituted measures to increase private
employers’ verification of workers’ immigration
status. On August 10, 2007, Homeland Security
secretary Michael Chertoff and Commerce sec-
retary Carlos Gutierrez announced a number of
steps to tighten and expand employment eligi-
bility verification.18 Among other things, they
proclaimed the commencement of a rulemak-
ing to require all federal contractors and vendors
to use E-Verify. Full compliance would expand
participation in the program by some 200,000
companies, a more than 20-fold increase to
about 3.5 percent of all U.S. employers. Numer-
ous bills have been introduced in Congress to
promote EEV in various ways,19 and the admin-
istration will attempt to convince states to do
the same thing.20
Secretaries Chertoff and Gutierrez also
announced DHS’s issuance of a “no-match”
regulation increasing employers’ liability if
their workers’ names and SSNs do not corre-
spond to SSA records.21 Plans to “update” the
civil fines for hiring illegal immigrants would
raise penalties by 25 percent and expand crim-
inal investigations of the country’s employers.
Secretaries Chertoff and Gutierrez further
declared that the administration would seek
to expand the data sources E-Verify can check,
including visa and passport information. They
will seek access to state motor vehicle depart-
ment records and photographs to “lay the
groundwork for further expansion” of the
electronic employment eligibility verification
system.22
Finally, they announced that the adminis-
tration would publish a regulation to reduce
the number of documents that employers
could accept for I-9 forms or E-Verify. The reg-
ulation could reduce the number all the way
down to a single, nationally uniform ID. 
The major immigration reform bill debat-
ed in Congress last summer would have
required new hires to have a REAL ID Act–
compliant card for employment eligibility
purposes within three years.23 REAL ID is the
troubled 2005 national ID law that many
states have declined to implement. Debate on
the immigration bill collapsed when the
Senate appeared willing to strip REAL ID
from the bill24 and an amendment calling for
$300 million in spending on REAL ID failed.25
Seeking to revive this moribund national ID
law, however, the administration may try to do
by regulation what Congress would not do in
legislation.
Along with promoting EEV and worker
registration by any means, the administration
has worked to wear down resistance in various
ways. Administration officials have lobbied
state officials to go along with the national ID
law.26 And in late September 2007, the U.S.
government sued the state of Illinois, seeking
to nullify an impediment that state had placed
in the way of the administration’s EEV plans.27
In an entry on the DHS’s new “Leadership
Journal” blog, Secretary Chertoff announced
the lawsuit, asking: “Could it be that the
Illinois state legislature wants to prevent busi-
nesses from using the best available tools to
determine whether new employees are illegal
aliens? I certainly hope not, but that’s precise-
ly what a new state law is poised to do.”28
In fact, the Illinois Right to Privacy in the
Workplace Act bars Illinois employers from
enrolling in E-Verify or any similar system
until the SSA and DHS can make final deter-
minations on 99 percent of their tentative
nonconfirmation notices within three days.
In other words, if the system will prevent
Illinois workers from working, the state wants
nothing to do with it.
Difficulty of administration is one of sev-
eral formidable problems with trying to
build an EEV system for federal immigration
law enforcement. Creating a nationwide sys-
tem for checking identity and eligibility is
much more easily said than done. 
Franz Kafka’s Solution to
Illegal Immigration
A nationwide EEV system would send a
substantial number of workers—native-born
and legal immigrant alike—into labyrinthine
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bureaucratic processes, preventing them from
working until the federal government deemed
their papers to be in order. It would be more
like something out of a Franz Kafka novel
than a sound U.S. federal policy. EEV would
delay or deny the employment of American
workers in numerous ways.
Screening Workers Screens Out Workers
Think of electronic employment verifica-
tion as a screen through which all workers
would have to pass before they could earn a
living. The problem is to get eligible workers
through the screen quickly and to keep ineli-
gible workers from passing through. It is
hard to do both at the same time. The feder-
al government currently has only fragments
of the infrastructure for accomplishing this
goal, and the processes for doing so are rife
with flaws.
For example, simple errors in transcription
and data entry by employees and employers
will create a baseline wrongful tentative non-
confirmation rate. According to a recent sur-
vey of employers participating in Basic Pilot,
52 percent had received at least one tentative
nonconfirmation for a new employee caused
by data entry mistakes.29
Then we must consider the error rate in
federal government databases. In December
2006, the SSA’s Office of the Inspector
General estimated that the agency’s “Numi-
dent” file—the data against which Basic Pilot
checks worker information—has an error rate
of 4.1 percent. Every error resulted in Basic
Pilot’s providing incorrect results.30 At that
rate, 1 in every 25 new hires would receive a
tentative nonconfirmation. At 55 million new
hires each year,31 this rate produces about
11,000 tentative nonconfirmations per work-
day in the United States—a little more than 25
people per congressional district, each day of
the working week, all year long.
Knocking Rungs off the Ladder
No illusions should be harbored about the
impediments to working that this system
would create if expanded to a national scale.
Even the “simple” process of clearing up basic
data errors would carry with it formidable
problems.
Consider this hypothetical scenario that
illustrates the trouble an ordinary worker
might have with the EEV program: Peggy
Smith is a single mother of two, born and
raised in the Midwest town where a new Big
Store recently opened. On Tuesday afternoon,
retail chain the Big Store calls Peggy to tell her
it has accepted her application to work as a
sales clerk trainee. 
The new job is a coup for Peggy because she
has struggled diligently to get her high school
equivalency degree while making ends meet
since her husband was killed in a car crash. She
will start work the following Monday with a
two-week (paid!) training course that is given
at the store once a quarter.
On Thursday afternoon, she comes in to
the human resources office, her two middle-
school-age children in tow, with the documen-
tation necessary for her Form I-9. Human
resources enters the data into the EEV system
just before the close of business Thursday,
finding that Peggy is a tentative nonconfirma-
tion. Human resources calls her to tell her
about the problem Friday morning, but she
cannot make it back to the store to collect the
written instructions on how to appeal her
nonconfirmation before the weekend. 
On Monday, arriving early for training,
Peggy is presented with instructions for appeal-
ing her nonconfirmation. The instructions tell
her to visit a Social Security Administration
office that is 30 minutes away. The SSA office is
open Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. Her usual shift and the training ses-
sions are from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and she
must pick up her kids from their after-school
activities most days of the week.
The EEV program’s requirements do not
permit employers to delay training or an
actual start date based upon a tentative non-
confirmation.32 Even if Big Store could delay
her start date, Peggy does not want to forgo a
quarter’s work by missing the training that
each new clerk trainee gets. Hoping that the
problem will go away, Peggy attends the Big
Store training sessions each day. Because she
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has not appeared at a government office to
contest her nonconfirmation within eight
days, the EEV system issues a final noncon-
firmation to the Big Store, and Peggy is fired.
Welcome to the Jungle
Even if Peggy were somehow confident
enough with her employment situation to
get time away from training, and even if this
recent recipient of her GED were familiar
enough with the procedure for contesting a
tentative nonconfirmation (while juggling
childcare), the unwelcoming and inefficient
processes she would encounter at the federal
government’s offices should not be lightly
dismissed. Disputes of tentative nonconfir-
mations would not happen in lushly carpet-
ed offices with marble columns, hot coffee,
and friendly, attentive staff. The experience
of American workers when they sought per-
mission to work would be much more like
their trips to the nation’s departments of
motor vehicles, post offices, and dentists—
long lines, unfriendly service, and painful
procedures.
Some evidence indicates what American
workers would experience when they went to
clear up their tentative nonconfirmations. At
the beginning of 2007, a new travel restriction
was imposed on all persons traveling by air
between the United States and Western Hemi-
sphere countries. Americans visiting these
nearby neighbors are now required to present
a passport to reenter the United States, for-
merly not required if other proof of a right to
reenter was available. This requirement was an
opening step in the implementation of a pro-
gram called the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative, which—for little security benefit—
will eventually require all Americans visiting
local neighboring countries to carry a pass-
port.33
The new rule drove a crush of Americans
to passport offices seeking travel documents
and caused delays in processing of up to a
month and a half, even though the State
Department had augmented its staff.34
Travelers across the country had their plans
thrown into doubt, and they angrily besieged
State Department offices. The bill for the
increased demand for passports has been
estimated at $1 billion for just three years.35
The passport issuance process is a loose
parallel to the probable system for contesting
tentative nonconfirmations. Although the
number of tentative nonconfirmations may
not be as high, the EEV system would be
expected to handle about a million transac-
tions each week, with more than 2 million of
those getting further review as tentative non-
confirmations each year.
It gets worse. For a significant number of
American workers, challenging tentative non-
confirmations would not be just a matter of
presenting their documents and cleaning up
the data in government systems. Counterat-
tacks on the system would complicate things.
Many law-abiding American citizens would
enter SSA and DHS offices as criminal sus-
pects and potential candidates for deportation.
Counterattacks and
Complications
Immigrants and employers dedicate their
ingenuity to getting what they want and
need. Although a national EEV system would
reduce the growth in illegal immigration by
some measure, it would also prompt illegal
immigrants and some employers to under-
take a variety of countermeasures.
For example, more people would work
“under the table.” Workers and employers
would collude—even more often than they do
now36—to avoid the already substantial regula-
tory hassles and costs of working on the
books. With the increased liability for employ-
ers who did comply with the Form I-9 process
(the updated penalties noted earlier), follow-
ing the letter of the law would be riskier, and
violating the law by going underground
would be relatively more attractive. 
Avoidance of EEV would be one result of
strengthened internal enforcement. But a
variety of counterattacks on the EEV system
would be part of the response as well. They
would create extraordinary new costs and
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complexities that would burden U.S. workers
while weakening EEV’s deterrence to illegal
employment and immigration.
Counterattack, Response, and Counter-
Counterattack
One counterattack on the EEV system that
illegal immigrants would adopt is a mere shift
in strategy. Today, many submit false docu-
mentation of plausible names and SSNs for
the Form I-9 process. This technique would
not pass EEV, of course: the name and SSN
must match in the SSA’s records. 
In response, illegal immigrants would
adjust their frauds so that they use name and
SSN pairs that match. It is slightly more dif-
ficult to do but easily worthwhile to procure
“legal” work.
To respond to this attack, the EEV system
would monitor the use of name and SSN
pairs. When a name and SSN were used too
often in succession, or in different parts of
the country, the system would “flag” the
name and SSN pair. Its users would be sus-
pected of fraud, and they would be tentative-
ly nonconfirmed.
However, this response would have costs.
One, of course, is that it requires a federal data-
base that records every new hire in the coun-
try—yet another of many incremental increases
in the tracking of law-abiding Americans.
None of them are terribly objectionable by
themselves, but the totality is quite concerning.
A more immediate cost is that law-abiding
citizens would regularly stand accused of
identity fraud. The SSA and DHS would not
know which user of a name-SSN pair was the
genuine person and which was using a false
identity. EEV would tentatively nonconfirm
all users of that name-SSN pair. The “true”
individuals attached to fraudulently used
identities would learn of identity fraud in
their names when they were refused work by
EEV and plunged into a bureaucratic morass. 
Today, identity fraud creates financial dif-
ficulties for innocent victims when they find
that their financial reputations have been
sullied. EEV would also make them unem-
ployable. 
Illegal immigrants would counterattack
in response to the tracking of name-SSN
pairs by using original name-SSN pairs with
each new hire. EEV would cause illegal aliens
to seek out name-SSN pairs that have not
been used recently in employment. It would
create a bigger criminal market for American
citizens’ personal information. 
Since 2005, the Privacy Rights Clearing-
house has been collecting information about
data breaches that could expose individuals to
identity theft.37 Not all of the breaches it
includes in its study concern both name and
SSN—some have financial account numbers,
driver’s license numbers, and other key identi-
fiers—but by late 2007, more than 200 million
records had been breached.
Currently, data breaches rarely result in
identity fraud. A June 2007 Government
Accountability Office report found evidence
of identity fraud resulting from relatively few
breaches.38 Today, victims’ family members
and friends, household employees, and finan-
cial services personnel with access to sensitive
personal information are often the perpetra-
tors of identity fraud. By creating new demand
for name and SSN pairs, EEV would increase
the value of breached identity data and the
rate of identity fraud. The casual criminals
who now produce fake IDs for illegal immi-
grants would organize information networks
to meet the demand for “fresh” names and
SSNs. 
These networks might steal legitimate
companies’ logins and human resources
data, enrolling shell companies in EEV to
ping the database for usable sets of identi-
fiers. Using the photo-screening tool (dis-
cussed below), they might collect thousands
of photos from which each illegal immigrant
could select the citizen he or she most resem-
bles to impersonate with forged documents.
Yet another attack on the EEV system
would be to corrupt the federal employees
who handle tentative nonconfirmations. As
so often happens in departments of motor
vehicles (DMVs) across the country,39 crimi-
nals would find federal workers willing to use
their access—or fellow workers’ logins—to
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“confirm” people operating under false iden-
tities. Doing so may well exclude from work
the people whose identities are being used.
Consider also how employers would pro-
tect themselves. With illegal immigrants
today coming predominantly from Spanish-
speaking countries south of the U.S. border,
identity fraud and corruption attacks on the
EEV system would focus largely on Hispanic
surnames and given names. Recognizing that
Hispanic employees—even native-born citi-
zens—are more often caught up in identity
fraud and tentative nonconfirmation hassles,
employers would select against Hispanics in
their hiring decisions. New hires from other
ethnic groups would be less likely to bring
employers such trouble—to say nothing of
the updated penalties previously discussed.
The wrongful discrimination that the Basic
Pilot program was supposed to suppress
would increase under EEV because of coun-
terattacks on the system. 
Shockingly, the current E-Verify program
has no process for appealing final nonconfir-
mations. The DHS Web page with informa-
tion “for employees” provides no advice to
workers who believe they have been wrongly
refused the right to work by DHS.40 A nation-
wide EEV system would wrongly give thou-
sands of eligible American workers final non-
confirmations each year, with no apparent
appeal process, blatantly depriving them of
due process and, of course, their livelihoods.
Not all the ills that EEV would cause
American citizens are easy to predict. Along
with those discussed here, others would
appear in any full-scale implementation. The
consequences of scaling up a small program
like Basic Pilot/E-Verify should not be under-
estimated. It has many flaws at its current size,
but taking the program national would be a
change in kind, not in degree. It would create
new and different problems.
The employers in Basic Pilot/E-Verify now
are relatively well equipped and motivated
compared to the variety of employers that an
expanded EEV system would encounter. Most
small businesses have no personnel dedicated
to compliance. Many businesspeople are rarely
connected or not connected to the Internet,
because of remoteness, cost, or lack of busi-
ness necessity. The compliance and accuracy
rates experienced in an expanded program
would be lower than what exists now, and dis-
crimination rates would be higher.
Known or unknown today, the infirmities
in EEV and the counterattacks on a full-scale
system would weaken it as a tool for reducing
illegal immigration. They would promote
wrongful discrimination. Moreover, they
would plunge a significant number of native-
born American citizens into Kafkaesque feder-
al bureaucratic procedures, denying them
work and money to feed their families until a
federal government database says they are
allowed to do so. 
EEV, National ID, and
Worker Surveillance
People angered by illegal immigration are
undoubtedly frustrated that internal enforce-
ment works so poorly and that our systems
provide so little security against people enter-
ing the country illegally. This is simply because
big, uniform identity systems do not work
well. As Phillip J. Windley, the former chief
information officer of Utah, observes in his
book Digital Identity: 
Visions that a centralized approach
will promote security, cost savings, or
management simplicity are a mirage.
Centralized digital identity systems do
not scale. Identity relationships are
inherently web-like in structure, while
centralized technologies like directo-
ries are hierarchical.41
In other words, identity works well in one-
on-one transactions, in groups, and in volun-
tary organizations. People and businesses nat-
urally collect the identifiers and other infor-
mation they need for meetings, contracts,
dates, employment, friendship, and so on. But
people do not have a single identity that can be
captured and applied to all their relation-
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ships.42 As Windley points out, relationships
define the many different identities people
have.43 Identities do not define relationships—
at least not in a modern, free country.
Bringing Americans into a uniform govern-
ment identity system—for controlling illegal
immigration or any other purpose—would
make people’s relationship with government
one of the foremost in their lives. It would be
an attempt to force a relationship on them that
many do not want. But a successful EEV sys-
tem—indeed, successful internal enforcement
of federal immigration law—requires this kind
of overweening, unworkable, and unacceptable
identity system.
Several bills introduced in recent Congresses
have proposed establishing federal EEV systems
but have denied creating a national ID card, say-
ing things like, “Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to authorize, directly or indirectly,
the issuance or use of national identification
cards or the establishment of a national identi-
fication card.” Establishing a national EEV sys-
tem without a national ID card is nearly impos-
sible, and the national-ID denials in these bills
have been false.44 All proposals and plans to
improve the Form I-9 process—whether or not
by going electronic—show that internal enforce-
ment of federal immigration law requires a
national ID.
I-9s and Identity
In personal interactions, people use iden-
tification constantly. When they have met
before, people are very adept at recognizing
each other again using their sight, hearing,
and other senses. This facility enables people
to pick up where they left off when they see
each other a second, third, and fourth time.
The success and familiarity people have with
in-person identification may give policymak-
ers excessive confidence in identification’s
power in other contexts. 
Currently, U.S. employers must collect
and examine identity and eligibility informa-
tion from all employees at the time of hire.
They can do so through a single document,
such as a passport or certificate of U.S. citi-
zenship, or through two separate documents,
one each for identity and eligibility, such as a
driver’s license and Social Security card. The
employer must attest, under penalty of per-
jury, that it has examined the documents and
found they appear to be genuine and that the
employee appears eligible to work in the
United States.
The conversion of every small businessper-
son and human resources director into an
immigration agent surely hides the cost of the
enforcement regime, but it does not necessari-
ly work well to combat illegal employment.
For example, employers often fail to accurate-
ly identify their workers, hiring unauthorized
workers despite faithfully carrying out their
duties under the law.
The opening of the employment relation-
ship is not like ongoing personal relationships.
Particularly in low-skill jobs, the new employee
proffers his or her identity for the first time as
the relationship begins. The employer has little
reason, and takes little time, to examine the
applicant’s identity bona fides. 
At this early point in the relationship,
however, the law requires the employer to
examine and report on the new employee’s
identity information. It is not a natural, per-
sonal interaction of the kind that works so
well in families. Employers identify their new
employees using ID cards.
Identification by Card
The process of identifying someone by card
is important and valuable, allowing people to
be treated as “known,” to a degree, from the
first encounter. But the identification-by-card
process is also fraught with weaknesses that
can undermine the process when it does not
benefit both parties. Figure 1 illustrates the
three steps by which a card transfers identity
information from the ID subject (the card-
holder) to the ID verifier (or relying party). 
First, the subject applies to a card issuer
(such as a DMV) for a card, typically supply-
ing nearly all the personal information the
card will contain. Next, the card issuer creates
a card, supplying information to any later
verifier. Finally, the verifier compares the
card to the person presenting it. Having veri-
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fied that the card is about the subject, the ver-
ifier accepts the information on the card.
Each of these three steps is a point of
weakness and an opportunity for false infor-
mation to creep in. In the first step, the sub-
ject may supply the card issuer with false
information (including false documents), or
the subject may corrupt employees within
the card issuer, causing them to issue a gen-
uine, but inaccurate, card. A fraudulently or
corruptly acquired genuine card will almost
certainly deceive any later employer.
At issue in the second step is the security of
the card against forgery or tampering. Although
many government-issued ID documents are
quite resistant to forgery and tampering, the
broadened use of these documents (including
for immigration control) has increased the value
of forging and altering them. Employers, who
would be acting against their interests to discov-
er such things, cannot be expected to discover
forgery or tampering of any decent quality.
A photo-screening tool pilot program
recently initiated by DHS is intended to detect
certain forgeries.45 When a noncitizen new hire
presents a DHS-issued permanent resident
card or employment authorization document,
employers in this program are required to com-
pare the photograph on the card to a copy of
the photograph appearing on the employer’s
computer screen via the EEV system. If the
photographs do not match, the employee is
issued a tentative nonconfirmation. 
This crosscheck does not solve the hard
problem—people entering the ID system
through fraud or corruption—but it does pro-
vide security against one type of forgery attack
on the EEV system. DHS desires to collect pass-
port photos from the State Department and
driver’s license photos from DMVs around the
country to expand this program from DHS-
issued documents to all Americans’ passports
and driver’s licenses. This expansion, of course,
involves creating a national photo-ID database.
The photo verification tool may cause
employers to spend a little more time consid-
ering the appearance of the new hire, but just
as likely, employers will believe that comparing
the images on the card and computer is all
they need to do. That procedure does nothing
to establish whether the person presenting the
card is the person it was issued to. What mat-
ters is that the picture on the card is a picture
of the person presenting it. 
This is the third step in the identification-
by-card process, comparing the identifiers on
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Identification by Card
Source: Jim Harper, Identity Crisis: How Identification Is Overused and Misunderstood (Washington: Cato Institute,
2006).
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a card to the subject. Here, as in the second
step, employers will not be terribly eager to dis-
cover deception, such as someone presenting
the card of a person similar in appearance. A
number of factors explain why the verifier
check is weak in the employment context.
People are better at recognizing faces of their
own race and familiar races than faces that
look different. Strong social pressures exist—
from the fear of rudeness to the appearance of
racism—not to second-guess the picture on
the card a person has presented. The third step
in the identification-by-card process is anoth-
er weakness.
The Ideal Fix? Cradle-to-Grave Biometric
Tracking
Each of the steps can be shored up, of
course, and some of them would be strength-
ened in small ways by elements of EEV. But
the things necessary to make a system like
this really impervious to forgery and fraud
would convert it from an identity system into
a cradle-to-grave biometric tracking system.
Almost no way exists to do national EEV that
is not a step down that road.
Let us take the identification-by-card
process and assess what is necessary to make
it hold up against the frauds, forgeries, and
other weaknesses that undermine EEV:
Verification of identifiers, the verifier
check that ties the card to the bearer, can be
strengthened and improved. Rather than
relying on the fallible human perception
used in verifying photo-ID cards, an “im-
proved” EEV system would use modern bio-
metric measuring of each American, such as
by fingerprint readers or iris scanners. Were
every American biometrically registered, the
biometric information embedded in their
cards—retrieved from the card, retrieved from
the human, and compared by machine—
could provide much stronger assurance to
verifiers that cards are about the people pre-
senting them.
The security of cards against forgery and
tampering (the concern raised in the second
ID-by-card step) can be improved vastly with
a variety of techniques, especially by using
encryption. Printing or embedding informa-
tion in a card using cryptographic techniques
can establish with a high degree of certainty
that the information was placed there by a
particular agency and that it has not been
altered since it was placed there. This tech-
nique can, however, conceal from the ID sub-
jects themselves what is on the cards they
must carry and display. The photo-screening
tool pilot program is a very crude, noncryp-
tographic version of this kind of security,
showing that the photo on a card has not
been replaced or altered.
The veracity of the information that makes
it onto a card may be the most challenging ele-
ment to improve. After all, the information on
identity cards is a collection of biographical
data—name, date of birth, address, height,
weight, and such—that is not easily verifiable.
Names change or hyphenate, for example, as
people marry, divorce, and remarry.
The way to ensure that accurate data are
found on a card is to abandon the current
practice of allowing applicants for identity
cards to submit information about them-
selves. Rather, identity information and
records of important life events could be cat-
aloged from birth (or a person’s first entry
into the country) using powerful machine-
readable biometrics, all the way up to DNA, as
“index card” identifiers. The photo-screening
tool is a step in this direction: it begins to
make the dossier as important as the card.
Applicants for cards could submit some
of the information, but the core identity
information on each card would have to be
tied to a central biometric identity reposito-
ry—probably run by the government. Reliable
biographical information would have to be
collected and stored by this repository. This
system would deny potential fraudsters the
ability to submit false information to ID
issuers, and it would suppress their frauds.
This excursion into an “ideal” employment
eligibility system shows where internal enforce-
ment of immigration law almost invariably
leads: to a national, cradle-to-grave, biometric
tracking system—a national ID and surveil-
lance system. IRCA could be administered
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without these things, but the chances of that
being done are very, very slim.
A Narrow, Nonidentifying Alternative
A credential such as eligibility for employ-
ment under IRCA can be proved without cre-
ating a nationwide biometric tracking scheme.
In fact, templates already exist. But it is unlike-
ly to see adoption.
The Transportation Security Administra-
tion’s Registered Traveler program currently
accepts privately issued documents like the
Clear card46 from Verified Identity Pass, Inc., to
prove a person’s membership in RT. The Clear
system is designed so that it does not create
records of travelers’ use of the system, even as it
provides biometric proof of their membership
in RT using iris and fingerprint scanning.
A similar system could verify employment
eligibility without surveillance and tracking.
The government agency or other credential
provider would have to examine applicants’
proof of citizenship (and noncitizens’ proof
of eligibility) and, without making copies of these
documents or of the person’s biometrics, issue a
biometric card or token that indicates to ver-
ifiers only work eligibility and any time limits
on that eligibility. When a person was hired,
a biometric tie to records securely stored on
the card or token would indicate his or her
eligibility for employment.
As simple as such a system would be,
strong government resistance makes it very
unlikely that it will see the light of day. The
TSA currently requires that Clear card users
present government-issued ID at airports, for
example, even though the Clear system pre-
sents biometric proof of RT membership
based on a government-issued ID that the
Clear user previously presented. (Verified
Identity Pass CEO Steven Brill has charitably
characterized the TSA’s defenses of this dou-
ble-ID rule as “plainly absurd.”)47
Governments have strong interests in track-
ing people, for both legitimate and not-so-legit-
imate reasons. Many government programs
accord rights and benefits based on biographi-
cal information that must be recorded, main-
tained, and periodically checked. For the vast
majority of people, however, employment eligi-
bility under IRCA is not such a program. Most
workers in the United States who are citizens
will be eligible to work under IRCA for their
entire lives. Maintaining data about them after
a biometric work-eligibility card has issued
would not serve any administrative purpose.
Nevertheless, the government would not
accept a tracking-free system for two reasons.
First, a system like EEV “requires” identifica-
tion and tracking to shift the risk of error in
the card-issuance process from the govern-
ment to the citizen. A wrongly issued work-
eligibility card that does not also publicly
identify the bearer could not be cancelled or
recalled if it were issued because of mistake,
fraud, or corruption. All cards would have to
be replaced if the government had failed to
administer its system well. 
Second, tracking preserves government
power. A work-eligibility and tracking system
such as EEV makes the individual’s employ-
ment eligibility subject to revision at a later
time, if the government wants to change the
rules or adapt the system to new purposes,
for example. A nonidentifying work-autho-
rization card or token denies government the
power to change its policies without the
expense and effort of reissuing all cards or
tokens.
Governments are averse to accepting the
risk of error, and they rarely exhibit the disci-
pline needed to avoid tracking of people who
interact with their programs.48 Unless the fed-
eral government can accept the risk of error
and is willing to commit to lasting employ-
ment eligibility rules, it will require any inter-
nal enforcement program to use databases
and tracking rather than just issuing cards
that prove eligibility to work and nothing
more. It will push Americans toward a nation-
al ID and worker surveillance system.
Some people claim that they would prefer
a national ID and this kind of surveillance to
attack the scourge of illegal immigration. But
the costs of such a system—in American citi-
zens’ dollars, in privacy, and in lost American
values—would be substantial, even as it failed
to curtail illegal immigration.
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An EEV Tax, Privacy
Undone, and Mission Creep 
Unleashed
Were the national ID system necessary for
effective EEV put in place, employers could do
somewhat reliable verification of employment
eligibility, but the system would impose many
costs on the country and society. The dollar
costs of a nationwide EEV system would be
high. EEV would have far greater privacy con-
sequences than the current system—conse-
quences that would fall on American citizens,
not on illegal immigrants. And, once in place,
an EEV system would be used for everything
from health care to gun control. Expanded
EEV would invert our federal system and
explode limited government. Final employ-
ment decisions would no longer be made by
employers and workers, but by a federal gov-
ernment bureaucracy—indeed, by a federal
database system.
Costs in Taxpayer Dollars
In December 2005, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated the costs of the elec-
tronic employment verification system in HR
4437, an immigration reform bill in the 109th
Congress.49 Those costs were substantial.
Under the Basic Pilot expansion in that
bill, CBO found that 50 million to 55 million
new hires would have to be verified each year.
A total of 145 million currently employed
workers would have to have been screened
using the expanded system by 2012. CBO’s
estimate was conservative; it excluded agri-
cultural workers.
Given the massiveness of the undertaking,
CBO estimated $100 million in short-run
costs for upgrading software, hardware, data-
bases, and other technology. To handle queries
about tentative nonconfirmations, DHS and
the SSA would have had to spend approxi-
mately another $100 million per year on new
personnel. The federal government, states,
localities, and private businesses would all
have to spend more for screening their work-
ers. Accordingly, CBO found that the man-
dates in the bill would exceed the thresholds
set by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995.
The national ID system required to do
EEV at all well would be even more expensive.
The REAL ID Act—our moribund national
ID law—is a first step toward the comprehen-
sive national ID system that would be needed
to do EEV successfully. In proposed regula-
tions for the REAL ID law, DHS estimated
$17 billion in costs to implement REAL ID.50
About $11 billion of those implementa-
tions costs would fall directly on state gov-
ernments. Because states already have func-
tioning DMVs, this increment is the low end
of the spectrum. Were the SSA or some other
federal entity to create an identity infrastruc-
ture from scratch, the costs would be tens of
billions more.
The public would bear the other $6 billion
of REAL ID implementation costs in  navigat-
ing the new bureaucracy and red tape needed
just to get a driver’s license. Individuals would
have to dig up birth certificates or get copies
from public records offices (some of which
may not exist any more, such as in New
Orleans). Native-born American citizens who
may never have traveled overseas would need
to search for proof of “legal presence” in the
country. Americans would stand in very long
lines at DMV offices. A DHS analysis detailed
the 10-year time-costs of REAL ID to citizens,
estimating 161.9 million hours preparing
applications, 26.5 million hours obtaining
birth certificates, 15.8 million hours obtaining
Social Security cards, and 64.7 million hours
on DMV visits.51
The smallest movement in the direction of
a national ID has revealed the kinds of prob-
lems that would arise from attempting to herd
Americans into the identity system needed for
EEV and internal enforcement. Alabama is a
state that tried to get ahead of the REAL ID
Act’s mandates in 2006. Attempting simply to
match up the names in SSA databases with
motor vehicle bureau records, Alabama sent
letters to individuals whose records were mis-
matched, asking them to correct the “erro-
neous” information on their driver’s licenses.
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Thousands of panicked Alabama residents
jammed Department of Public Safety offices
thinking they would lose their licenses.52 Such
problems would multiply dramatically should
the national identity infrastructure needed for
EEV ever be created. 
American Citizens’ Privacy 
The American-citizen taxpayer would incur
not only pocketbook costs and increased
bureaucracy but lost privacy as well. An elec-
tronic system is not just a faster paper system.
It has dramatically different effects on privacy
and the security of personal data.
When an employer collects a form like the
I-9 and puts it in a file, the information on
the I-9 remains practically obscure. It is not
very easy to access, copy, or use. This protects
privacy, and it protects against the digital
data breaches that so regularly come to light.
When an organization enters I-9 informa-
tion into a Web form and sends it to the SSA
and DHS, that information is very easy for
those entities to access, copy, share, and use.
It is likely combined with “meta-data”—infor-
mation about when the data were collected,
from whom, and so on.
The EEV process would give these agencies
access to a wealth of new data about every
American’s working situation. Because it uses
the SSN, EEV data would easily be correlated
with tax records at the Internal Revenue Service,
education loan records in the Department of
Education, health records at the Department of
Health and Human Services, and so on. Ameri-
cans living with EEV should not expect that they
could get work if they were in arrears on any
debt to the U.S. government, for example.
Unless a clear, strong, and verifiable data
destruction policy were in place, any EEV sys-
tem, however benign in its inception, would be
a surveillance system that tracked all American
workers. The system would add to the data
stores throughout the federal government that
continually amass information about the lives,
livelihoods, activities, and interests of every-
one—especially law-abiding citizens.
Beyond EEV’s direct costs, the identity sys-
tem required to do EEV successfully entails
further privacy costs and threats. The privacy
and data security consequences arising from
the necessary national ID, for example, are
immense, increasingly well understood, and
probably insurmountable.
The REAL ID Act requires states to main-
tain databases of foundational identity docu-
ments, creating an incredibly attractive target
for criminal organizations, hackers, and other
wrongdoers. They would have more motiva-
tion than ever to collect identity information
should a nationwide EEV system control
access to employment. 
The breach of a state’s entire database—or
the whole country’s—containing copies of birth
certificates and various other documents and
information could topple the identity system
we use in the United States today. This is the
risk posed by the recent colossal data breach in
Britain, in which essential data about 25 mil-
lion U.K. citizens were copied to discs, placed in
the post, and lost.53 The best data security is
achieved by avoiding the creation of large data-
bases of sensitive and valuable information in
the first place. EEV would put Americans’ sen-
sitive personal information at risk.
The security of back-end systems is far from
the only problem. Creation of a nationally uni-
form identity system as required for EEV
would bring a major change in how American
society would use identity. It is not just anoth-
er in a series of small steps. The national ID
required by EEV would promote tracking of,
and data collection about, all citizens.
Economists know well that standards cre-
ate efficiencies and economies of scale. When
all the railroad tracks in the United States were
converted to the same gauge, for example, rail
became a more efficient method of trans-
portation. The same train car could travel on
tracks anywhere in the country, so more goods
and people traveled by rail. Uniform ID cards
would have the same influence on the uses of
ID cards.
Most driver’s licenses today have machine-
readable components like magnetic stripes and
bar codes. Their types, locations, and designs—
and the information they carry—differ from
state to state. For this reason, they are not used
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very often. But if all identification cards and
licenses were the same, as under REAL ID, or if
a national EEV card were used, economies of
scale would exist in producing card readers,
software, and databases to capture and use this
information. Americans would inevitably be
asked more and more often to produce an ID
card and to share the data from that card when
they engaged in various governmental and
commercial transactions.
Others would capitalize in turn on the
information harvested using national ID
cards and collected in state databases. Massed
personal information—publicly and privately
held—would be an irresistible attraction to
DHS and many other governmental entities,
which would dip into deep wells of data about
American citizens for an endless variety of pur-
poses.
Many people believe they have nothing to
hide and feel willing to have their employ-
ment tracked if it will stop illegal immigra-
tion. Unfortunately, it will not. Moreover,
most people who make the nothing-to-hide
claim balk when they are actually confronted
with stark choices about privacy.
People have things to hide. Maintaining a
private life is normal and natural. Indeed,
many people object on principle to compila-
tions of information about themselves, no
matter who is doing it and no matter what the
purpose. This is consistent with life in a free
country, where law-abiding citizens can pro-
tect their privacy for any reason or no reason.
Any electronic employment verification
system will be a target for hackers, a data
breach waiting to happen, a threat to the iden-
tity system we rely on today, and a surveillance
system for both corporate and government
use. Even if many of these flaws in a national
EEV system could be mitigated, it is not a sys-
tem that Americans should want. A successful
EEV system would see mission creep from its
first day.
Mission Creep
If an EEV system reliably identified people
and determined their legal status under feder-
al law, federal authorities would waste no time
in adapting it to new uses. In the immigration
area alone, proposals have been made to regu-
late housing in the same way as employment.
In Hazelton, Pennsylvania, for example, the
demagogic mayor sought and passed a law in
2006 making it illegal for landlords to “har-
bor” illegal aliens.54 In another 10 years, the
failure of EEV to weaken the economic mag-
net of the United States might convince feder-
al lawmakers that they must take this same
step.
The right to necessities other than housing
could be conditioned on legal status. Given
the failure of employment restriction to deter
illegal immigration, financial services could be
denied to all those who cannot prove their law-
ful presence through an adapted EEV system.
Federal legislation proposed in the 110th
Congress would regulate the documentation
that non-U.S. persons may use to open finan-
cial accounts in the name of terrorism and
immigration control.55 Legislation has also
been proposed to encourage public colleges
and universities to verify the immigration sta-
tus of students.56
Enforcement of immigration law is just
one of many uses EEV would be put to once
established. Many things could be brought
within the purview of federal authorities if a
national system for tracking and controlling
individuals were in place.
Health care is an area that would be ripe for
electronic tracking. Whether to enforce immi-
gration law, implement a health insurance
mandate, create a national health records
database, or carry out any other health policy
vogue, the national tracking system created
for EEV could be adapted to federal govern-
ment priorities in the health arena. A DHS
official recently suggested that a national ID
be required for purchasing cold medicine.57
An EEV system could take that policy a step
further and deny medicines and other pur-
chases to Americans without proper docu-
mentation.
The federal government might apply a
national EEV system to gun control. When
an EEV system exists, having purchasers of
guns prove they are citizens or legally entitled
17
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U.S. residents would not be asking too much.
Counting individuals’ gun purchases would
be easy with this database system, and it
could record the number of guns and quan-
tity of ammunition bought by any one per-
son. Indeed, statistical analysis could show
where an excess of weaponry was sold in any
one area. Authorities might use the system to
search for purchasers of too many guns,
believing they are feeding the black market or
perhaps caching weapons in a homegrown
terrorism plot. Never mind that the same
analysis would turn up law-abiding gun col-
lectors and avid sportsmen.
Speaking of terrorism, the biometric card
required for EEV would be readily adapted to
the identity-based security programs that
have grown up at airports since the Septem-
ber 11, 2001, attacks. Experienced travelers,
having had time in line to think about it,
know well that showing ID is very weak secu-
rity against committed threats—people will-
ing to kill themselves bombing an airliner are
willing to identify themselves beforehand.
But identification checks at airports make
uninformed people feel safer, and having peo-
ple show a nationally uniform biometric card
would augment that exercise in security the-
ater. It might also allow expansion of identity
checking to malls, subway stations, office
buildings, and other publicly accessible infra-
structure.58
A national EEV system would be an avenue
along which regulatory power over American
citizens would flow to the federal government.
It would draw vastly more information about
Americans’ lives into federal government data-
bases, and it would expose their sensitive data
to more security threats. The information-age
crime of identity fraud would blossom under
EEV because the value of breaking the uni-
form government identity system it requires
would grow higher. Building the EEV system
would cost billions and billions of taxpayer
dollars, while saddling American workers and
employers with regulatory burdens and crimi-
nal liability.
As an administrative tool, an EEV system
would have to be nearly perfect to avoid hav-
ing enormous negative effects on American
workers and employers. EEV would wrongly
screen out lawful American workers. Probable
counterattacks on the EEV system mean that
it will plunge law-abiding American citizens
into Kafkaesque bureaucracy, preventing
them from working until they can negotiate
their way through unwelcoming federal gov-
ernment offices. Unfathomably, today E-
Verify has no appeals process. Any national
EEV program would be an intrusive, expensive
incursion on the American workplace and the
rights of American workers.
Conclusion
Bad policies are like cancer. They metasta-
size and occupy other parts of the body politic.
Our country’s immigration law has held an
unnatural cap on new American workers’ com-
ing to the United States for decades now, and
attempts to make a success of that bad policy
have produced circumlocutions like “internal
enforcement” and “electronic employment eli-
gibility verification.” These are additional can-
cerous nodes that threaten American workers
with Kafkaesque bureaucracy, denied employ-
ment, a national ID system, and broad surveil-
lance.
The “problem” most illegal immigrants
present is their eagerness to enter our labor
markets, provide goods and services for
Americans’ consumption, and grow the U.S.
economic pie. Millions of otherwise honest,
hard-working, and law-abiding people have
come to the United States without documen-
tation. Many want very badly to follow the
same path our forefathers did, and they would
be a credit to this country if we made it legal
for them to come. In a deep irony, Congress
may soon expand EEV, increasing government
spending and bureaucracy so that our malad-
justed immigration law can continue to stifle
U.S. economic growth.
Proponents of internal enforcement and
electronic employment verification surely
stand on a sound principle—the rule-of-law
ideal that people should enter the country
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legally. But current immigration law is a
greater threat to the rule of law than any of
the people crossing the border to come here
and work. Our immigration policies have fos-
tered the illegality so common in the employ-
ment area. 
Heavier internal enforcement would not
reduce the illegality—it would promote it.
Faced with the alternative of living in poverty
and failing to remit wealth to their families,
illegal immigrants would deepen the modest
identity frauds they are involved in today.
Their actions would draw American citizens,
unfortunately, into a federal bureaucratic
identity vortex.
For minimal gains in illegal immigration
control, national EEV would sacrifice more-
important founding principles: the liberty
and personal freedom of American citizens;
constitutionally mandated limits on federal
power; low taxes, minimal regulation, and
competition; and privacy.
Instead of moving to electronic eligibility
verification, the policy of internal enforce-
ment should be eliminated, root and branch.
The need for it can be dissipated, and legality
fostered anew, by aligning immigration poli-
cy with the economic interests of the Ameri-
can people. Legal immigration levels should
be increased.
Up to this point in our nation’s history,
employers and workers have decided who
should work for whom. Even under the IRCA
regime as it stands now, employers select
whom they will hire, perhaps accepting some
potential liability if they hire someone who is
“ineligible.” 
Letting workers and employers get togeth-
er on their own terms makes eminent sense,
just like people deciding for themselves what
food they should eat and how to school their
children. With nationwide electronic employ-
ment verification, however, the United States
would move to a regime where the last word
on employment decisions would not be with
the worker and employer but with bureau-
crats in the federal government. This result
would extend federal government power into
an area where it has no business being. 
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